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NOTES AND COMMENTS
membership that a violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) should be
found.'"6 The Eighth Circuit's decision in Inter-Collegiate points out
that the impact upon employees' § 7 rights was not substantial.
Thus, without the requisite showing of unlawful motivation, the bar-
gaining lockout and the hiring of temporary presonnel should be
viewed as a lawfully adopted means to bring economic pressure to
bear upon the union.
THoMAs K. WOTRNG
MONETARY RECOVERY AS PREVENTIVE RELIEF
IN FAIR HOUSING ACTIONS BY THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL
A quarter of a century ago, Congress declared that the nation's
welfare required elimination of inadequate housing and timely reali-
zation of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every family.' However, for many years no federal legislation was
directed against racial discrimination as a source of deficient housing
conditions.2 During that period of inaction, discrimination became
'NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965).
'Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
2The 1960 census revealed that 46 per cent of the urban non-white population as
opposed to 14 per cent of the urban white population were living in deficient housing.
Hearings on S.1358, S.2114, and S.2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
A 1968 report painted a far more dismal picture, disclosing that two-thirds of urban
non-whites lived in substandard dwellings and general urban blight. REPOir OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CiviL DISOiDERS 257 (1968).
During the 1960's, discrimination in housing was increasingly mentioned at ad-
ministrative and congressional hearings as the leading cause of the housing problem
in the United States. At one such hearing, Sterling Tucker, Executive Director of the
Washington Urban League, testified that housing discrimination kills incentive to
achieve by normal means, produces generations of dependency and frustration, and
sets the pattern for future slums. Hearings on Housing in Washington Before the
United States Comm'n on Civil Rights 49 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings].
In congressional testimony, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Robert
Weaver noted that "[t]he rebuilding of our cities . . . cannot be successful unless we
eliminate all types of discrimination including discrimination in housing." Hearings
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more noticeable as the exodus of many whites to rapidly growing
suburbs created concentrations of blacks in inner-city ghettos.'
Against this background, Congress in 1968 enacted the Fair Housing
Act.' This legislation, comprising Title VIII of a comprehensive civil
rights package,5 was directed toward providing, "within constitu-
tional limitations, . . .fair housing throughout the United States."'
on S.1026, S.1318, S.1359, S.1362, S.1462, H.R. 2516, & H.R.10805 (Proposed Civil
Rights Act of 1967) Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 487 (1967). See generally Letter from
President John F. Kennedy to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Apr. 12,
1962, in 1962 Hearings at 12.
'Approximately 9 million whites left inner-cities for suburbs during the 1960's.
Hearings on De Facto Segregation & Housing Discrimination Before the Select Comm.
on Equal Educational Opportunity of the Senate, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2667 (1970). In
the same period, only 170,000 blacks migrated to the suburbs. Id.
Blacks attempting to obtain suburban housing often encountered discrimination.
This sometimes took the form of restrictive covenants despite such prohibitory Su-
preme Court decisions as Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24 (1948). One large developer-broker in the Washington, D.C., area retained
control on all future transfers of title or possession of new homes. Its covenant read:
No part of the land hereby conveyed shall ever be used, or occupied
by, or sold, demised, transferred, conveyed unto, or in trust for,
leased, or rented, or given, to Negroes, or any person of the Semitic
race, blood or origin, which racial description shall be deemed to
include Armenians, Jews, Hebrews, Persians, and Syrians, except
that this paragraph shall not be held to exclude partial occupancy of
the premises by domestic servants . ...
1962 Hearings, supra note 2, at 62. Other instances of discrimination were as refined,
if not as overt. For example, associations of brokers and property owners teamed in
Grosse Pointe, Michigan, to establish and maintain with mathematical precision a
point system capable of screening and weeding out "undesirables." Hearings in Detroit
Before the United States Comm'n on Civil Rights 476 (1960). A prospective purchaser
was graded upon such criteria as looks, dress, accent, religion, education, reputation,
and the degree to which his name, friends, and home were "typically American." Id.
at 479-80.
A passing grade was 50 points. However, those of Polish descent had
to score 55 points; southern Europeans including those of Italian,
Greek, Spanish or Lebanese origin had to score 65 points and those of
the Jewish faith had to score 85 points. Negroes and orientals were
excluded entirely.
Id. at 477.
The degree to which housing discrimination existed is manifested by a 1962 survey
of housing opportunities in Washington, D.C., for African diplomats. The Bureau of
Social Science Research sent letters to 214 luxury apartment buildings; only nine
owners indicated clearly that they would accept the diplomats as tenants. 1962 Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 161.
442 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
5Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
642 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
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Its broad-reaching provisions, applicable to most types of dwellings,,
prohibit racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination in sales and rent-
als of housing.'
Title VIII provides for three general methods of enforcement.
First, the victim of discrimination may commence an administrative
proceeding by filing a complaint with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.' If the agency believes that a statutory violation
has occurred, it will attempt to obtain compliance through concilia-
tion."' Second, the victim may institute a private civil action to en-
force his rights." A court may grant as relief "any permanent or
7The prohibitions of Title VIII are not applicable to the following types of housing:
(1) most single family houses sold or rented without the use of
real estate personnel and without discriminatory advertising; or
(2) rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occu-
pied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living
independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and oc-
cupies one of such living quarters as his residence; or
(3) dwellings owned or occupied by a religious group for a non-
commercial purpose and offered to persons of the same religion with-
out regard to race, color, or national origin; or
(4) private clubs not open to the public which, incident to their
primary purpose, provide their own lodging on a non-commercial basis
to members.
Id. §§ 3603(b), 3607 (1970).
Id. § 3604. Title VIII also forbids discrimination in the financing of housing and
in the providing of brokerage services. Id. §§ 3605, 3606.
'Id. § 3610.
'*Id. § 3610(a).
"Id. § 3612. Where coercion or intimidation has been used to interfere with rights
guaranteed by the Fair Housing Act, the victim may instead bring a proceeding under
42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1970), thereby avoiding under § 3612(a) a 180 day statute of
limitations as well as a possible continuance while conciliation efforts are in progress.
Enforcement of § 3617 is by "appropriate civil action."
A private civil action for relief from housing discrimination may also be filed under
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), which was part of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Section
1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
Although § 1982 "lay partially dormant for many years," the Supreme Court held
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), that the section still provided,
under the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, a valid independent
federal statutory ban against all racial discrimination, private and public, in the sale
and rental of property. Id. at 437. In finding that the enactment of the more specific
Title VIII had no effect upon the general terminology of § 1982, the Court specified
the most important differences between the statutes:
In sharp contrast to the Fair Housing Title. . . .[§ 1982] deals only
with racial discrimination and does not address itself to discrimina-
tion on grounds of religion or national origin. It does not deal specifi-
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temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order,
and may award to the plaintiff actual damages and not more than
$1,000 punitive damages . ."" Third, in prescribed circumstances
the Attorney General may bring a civil action against the discrimina-
tor to obtain relief for the individual victims.
13
Use of the administrative proceeding may be disadvantageous
because of statutory requirements that direct many complaints
through state and local channels. 4 Of the two remaining types of
cally with discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in
connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling. It does not prohibit
advertising or other representations that indicate discriminatory pref-
erences. It does not refer explicitly to discrimination in financing ar-
rangements or in the provision of brokerage services. It does not em-
power a federal administrative agency to assist aggrieved parties. It
makes no provision for intervention by the Attorney General. And,
although it can be enforced by injunction, it contains no provision
expressly authorizing a federal court to order the payment of damages.
Id. at 413-14 (footnotes omitted). For a detailed comparison of the two statutes, see
Smedley, A Comparative Analysis of Title VIII and Section 1982, 22 VAND. L. REv. 459
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Smedley].
1242 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (emphasis added). The court may also award to a prevailing
plaintiff court costs and reasonable attorney fees if he cannot afford them.
1342 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970) provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice
of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this
subchapter [title VIII], or that any group of persons has been denied
any of the rights granted by this subchapter and such denial raises an
issue of general public importance, he may bring a civil action in any
appropriate United States district court by filing with it a complaint
setting forth the facts and requesting such preventive relief, including
an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order, or other order against the person or persons responsible for such
pattern or practice or denial of rights, as he deems necessary to insure
the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this subchapter.
(Emphasis added.)
Additionally, Title IX (42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1970)) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
provides criminal penalties for willfully injuring, intimidating, or interfering with any
person attempting to exercise his right to fair housing. Use of this title has been
infrequent during the first six years of the Act. Professor Smedley cites two difficulties
associated with criminal penalties for fair housing violations. First, the Government
must be able to prove the elements of willful discrimination beyond a reasonable
doubt. Second, the defendant, entitled to a jury trial, is unlikely to be faced with 12
men wishing to impose fine or imprisonment on him for any type of housing discrimina-
tion. Smedley, supra note 11, at 472.
1'HUD will relinquish a complaint to a state or local agency if the jurisdiction
provides the aggrieved with rights and remedies substantially similar to federal law.
42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1970). Additionally, if an administrative proceeding is unsuccess-
ful, the victim of discrimination is not permitted to bring a civil action in federal court
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enforcement, action by the Attorney General, as opposed to a private
civil action, offers noticeable advantages to both the aggrieved and
the court system itself. The Attorney General has greater monetary
and manpower resources with which to conduct litigation than the
discrimination victims. Additionally, he can reduce the volume of
litigation by representing the interests of numerous potential plain-
tiffs against a common defendant.'" Unfortunately, the relative ad-
vantages of an action by the Attorney General are clouded by uncer-
tainty as to the type of relief that may be sought in such a suit.
While it is clear that the Attorney General may move under 42
U.S.C. § 3613 for injunctive or declaratory relief,'" the availability of
monetary recovery on behalf of discrimination victims is uncertain.
Section 3613 permits the Attorney General to request "such preven-
tive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or other order. . . , as he deems neces-
sary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights" granted by Title VIII. 7
Since no specific terminology enables the Attorney General to seek
any type of monetary recovery, the authority for such relief would
have to be derived from a broad construction" of the equitable phrase
"or other order."' 9
as long as a remedy exists under state or local fair housing law. Id. at § 3610(d).
Another possible drawback to the administrative proceeding is that the aggrieved has
only 30 days upon its unsuccessful termination to bring a private civil action. Id.
However, two courts have permitted an aggrieved to commence a private civil action
while the administrative proceeding is still in progress. See Miller v. Poretsky, EQUAL
OPPORTUNrrY IN HOUSING 13,587 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 21, 1973); Johnson v. Decker, 333 F.
Supp. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
'5 While private individuals may seek to represent a class, the problems associated
with class actions are numerous and beyond the scope of this article. For an annotation
on class actions as a method of seeking relief from racial discrimination, see Annot., 8
A.L.R. Fed. 461 (1971).
"See, e.g., United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973) (injunctive relief); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d
205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972) (declaratory relief).
742 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970) (emphasis added), the text of which appears in note 13
supra.
IRThe Supreme Court has on one occasion given the Fair Housing Act a broad
construction. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
Civil rights statutes traditionally enjoy a liberal construction. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul,
395 U.S. 298 (1969) (public accommodations title of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (housing discrimination bar in Civil Rights
Act of 1866).
"The phrase "or other order" appears in § 3613 among a list of various types of
equitable relief. It reasonably follows that the entire statute, delineating available
relief in actions by the Attorney General, is equitable in nature. See United States v.
Long, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 13,631 (D.S.C. Jan. 14, 1974), at 14,094. Other
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A federal district court in United States v. Long,2 recognizing the
question of monetary recovery as one of first impression, ' scrutinized
the language of the statute, applied a broad construction of "or other
order," and held that the phrase authorized pecuniary awards.2 The
courts interpreting analogous states have recognized the equitable nature of sections
containing the phrase "or other order." See United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616
(1951) (Housing and Rent Act of 1947); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395
(1946) (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734
(5th Cir. 1967) (Civil Rights Act of 1957).
2'EQuAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 13,631 (D.S.C. Jan. 14, 1974).
2 Several other district courts have approved consent decrees providing monetary
recovery for victims of housing discrimination in actions brought by the Attorney
General. See United States v. Colonial Village, Inc., Civil No. 252-73-A (E.D. Va.
1973); United States v. Moore, Civil No. 1172 (S.D. Ga. 1973); United States v. Gold-
berg, Civil No. 70-1223-Civ-PTF (S.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Magnolia Manor,
Inc., Civil No. 4681 (S.D. Miss. 1971); United States v. Lakratt Corp., Civil No. 69-
1662 (E.D. La. 1969). The precedental value of such decrees is questionable, for rarely
do they face the scrutiny of the court.
The court in Long found some precedental value in United States v. West Peach-
tree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971). In that case, the Fifth Circuit rejected
the defendants' contention that the courts were limited to awarding injunctive relief
under § 3613, holding that the phrase "or other order" includes the power to grant any
affirmative relief. Id. at 228. However, West Peachtree was not an action for monetary
recovery and the court gave no indication whether it considered such awards permissi-
ble as a type of affirmative relief.
Subsequent to the decision in Long, two other federal district courts have consid-
ered the validity of monetary recovery under § 3613. In United States v. West Subur-
ban Bd. of Realtors, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 13,641 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 1974),
the Attorney General sought "monetary damages" as supplemental relief in a civil
contempt proceeding commenced upon violation by the defendants of a consent decree.
The court granted the relief requested by the Attorney General but did not comment
on what types of monetary recovery were permissible. See notes 28-36 and accompany-
ing text infra. However, the court held that the 180 day statute of limitations applica-
ble to private civil actions commenced under the Fair Housing Act also limited actions
by the Attorney General. See note 50 infra.
"Damages" were also sought by the Attorney General in United States v. Pelzer
Realty Co., EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 13,656 (M.D. Ala. June 5, 1974), a case
remanded by the fifth circuit for issuance of a decree. The court denied monetary
recovery solely because damages were not pleaded nor proven in the original proceed-
ing. As a result, the defendants could not properly litigate the issue of damages and
were also deprived of an opportunity to request a jury trial. See notes 74-76 and
accompanying text infra.
2EQuAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING T 13,361, at 14,093-94. However, uncertainty as
to the validity of monetary recovery was so great that the district court stayed imple-
mentation of that portion of its order and certified the issue for interlocutory appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292
(1970). Section 1292 provides in pertinent part:
(b) When a district judge, in making a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that
such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
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defendants in Long were a Charleston, South Carolina, real estate
agency and its controlling partner. On the basis of considerable in-
criminating evidence, they were found to have engaged in discrimina-
tory conduct violative of the law.? To assure equal housing opportun-
ity in the future to all persons, the court issued an injunction and
order requiring adoption and implementation of a wide range of af-
firmative measures.
24
One of the measures ordered by the court was that the defendants
permit the Government to examine records for the purpose of compil-
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The
Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal
to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application
for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court
unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof
shall so order.
Denying the defendants a jury trial on the issue of monetary recovery, the district court
also certified this question for interlocutory appeal. See notes 74-76 and accompanying
text infra.
nEQUAL OPPORTUNrrY iN HoUSING 1 13,361, at 14,091-93. The defendant agency
rented apartments and houses in fifteen separate complexes and subdivisions. Of the
properties, eleven were rented exclusively to whites and four were rented primarily to
blacks. Id. at 14,084. Additionally, the defendant partner was the developer for a large
apartment complex in which more than 90 per cent of the tenants were black. Id. at
14,087. The Government's complaint charged that this arrangement constituted a
pattern and practice of resistance by the defendants to the full enjoyment by black
persons of the right to equal housing opportunity. The complaint also alleged that the
rental pattern denied to a group of persons rights guaranteed by the Fair Housing Act,
raising an issue of general public importance.
The court heard testimony which revealed that the agency coded and separated
applications to indicate race. Blacks were often told that the agency had no vacancies,
even when on every occasion apartments were available in white neighborhoods. Credit
checks and security deposits were required of almost all black applicants, but only a
small percentage of white applicants were treated similarly. Advertising of available
properties in black neighborhoods indicated that the units were available to "any
qualified buyer," but no such label was used in advertising for the agency's other
properties. The partner, in fact, even admitted to having instructed his employees to
avoid sales to blacks in white areas.
21d. at 14,094-96. The court enjoined the defendants, including their employees
and agents, from engaging in any conduct which denied equal housing opportunity to
any person because of his race, color, religion, or national origin. The defendants were
required to formulate in writing nondiscriminatory objective guidelines for the renting
of dwellings. Moreover, the court stipulated that the defendants instruct employees
and agents in carrying out the order and notify the public of their nondiscriminatory
policy. Finally, the defendants were directed to submit periodic reports in order to
effectuate the decree.
1974]
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ing a list of possible victims of discrimination.2 The Government
could then notify these victims of alternative courses of action includ-
ing "the right to submit to the court and attempt to establish a claim
for monetary compensation for racial discrimination. . . to be heard
by a Special Master, '2 pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.Y Unfortunately, the court did not specify what types
of monetary recovery it found allowable as "compensation" under
§ 3613.
21d. at 14,096.261d. at 14,096-97. Another alternative enabled discrimination victims to renew
their applications for apartments. If they met the rental standards applicable to all
tenants, they would be given priority for any available dwelling and paid moving
expenses within a 50 mile radius. Discrimination victims were also advised of the
alternative of proceeding individually against the defendants for damages under the
Fair Housing Act and/or the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See notes 11-12 and accompany-
ing text supra.
2FED. R. Civ. P. 53 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Appointment and Compensation. Each district court with
the concurrence of a majority of all the judges thereof may appoint one
or more standing masters for its district, and the court in which any
action is pending may appoint a special master therein. As used in
these rules the word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, an exam-
iner, a commissioner, and an assessor....
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception
and not the rule. . . .[In actions to be tried without a jury, save
in matters of account and of difficult computation of damages, a
reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional
condition requires it.
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may specify or
limit his powers and may direct him to report only upon particular
issues or to do or perform particular acts or to receive and report
evidence only ....
(e) Report.
(1) Contents and Filing. The master shall prepare a report upon
the matters submitted to him by the order of reference and, if required
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he shall set them forth
in the report. ...
(2) In Non-Jury Actions. In an action to be tried without a jury
the court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erro-
neous. Within 10 days after being served with notice of the filing of
the report any party may serve written objections thereto upon the
other parties. Application to the court for action upon the report and
upon objections thereto shall be by motion and upon notice. . . .The
court after hearing may adopt the report or may modify it or may
reject it in whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may
recommit it with instructions.
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Monetary recovery can generally be divided into three types."8 The
first, restitution, a remedy traditionally associated with unjust en-
richment, is often given a more expansive definition today." It is
commonly thought of as a remedy by which a defendant is made to
disgorge ill-gotten gains or to restore the status quo by returning to
the plaintiff something that in the court's view properly belongs to
him." In housing discrimination situations, restitution in private ac-
tions has included return of deposit" and possibly reimbursement for
such costs as moving and storage expense."2 A second type of mone-
tary recovery, actual damages, attempts to compensate a plaintiff
and is based upon his losses rather than the defendant's gains . 3 Ac-
tual damages are involved in most housing discrimination cases,
since most resulting injuries cannot be vindicated by restitution.
Within this classification falls compensation for emotional injury,3
the claim that has most often been raised in private housing discrimi-
nation suits, 35 and for such emotional injury as loss of bargain. 8 Puni-
tive damages, frequently awarded in private actions to victims of
housing discrimination, constitute a third general type of monetary
recovery.
On close examination, restitution appears available in actions by
2See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 1-2 (1973). Dobbs mentions nominal damages as a fourth
type of monetary recovery; such awards are usually a small amount to vindicate a
technical right where there has been no actual harm. Id. at 135.
Thus, the parameters of restitution are now ill-defined. See generally id. at 222-
29.
,5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.24, at 190.5 (2d ed. 1974).
31For an example of a private action to recover a deposit lost as a result of housing
discrimination, see Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291 (D. Md. 1973).
32For an example of a private action to recover moving and storage expenses
incurred as a result of housing discrimination, see Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d
380 (10th Cir. 1973).
ID. DOBBS, REMEDIES 137 (1973).
31In actions to recover for emotional injury, plaintiffs commonly raise such claims
as embarrassment or humiliation. The usual basis of recovery is in tort for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. See generally Duda, Damages for Mental Suffering in
Discrimination Cases, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 1 (1966).
"See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Title
Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973).
3'Computation of the proper award for loss of bargain is complicated. If, for exam-
ple, an individual is illegally denied housing at a cost of $150 a month and must instead
pay $200, he has suffered an apparent loss of $50 a month. However, if the substitute
housing is worth $250 a month as opposed to $100 for the original housing, he will
receive greater value for his money and thus appear to benefit as a result of the
discrimination. For an example of a private action to recover for loss of bargain result-
ing from housing discrimination, see Williams v. Streeter, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN
HOUSING 17,507 (Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, March 17, 1973).
1974]
800 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
the Attorney General under § 3613. Support for allowing this type of
monetary recovery may be derived from the recent Supreme Court
case of Curtis v. Loether,37 discussed below in connection with the
possibility of obtaining actual damages," as well as from two earlier
decisions of the Court. 9 In each of the earlier decisions, the phrase
"or other order," appearing in successive price control measures, 0
was held to permit restitution of "overceiling" rental payments in
Government actions on behalf of private persons." In one of those
37. U.S. - , 94 S. Ct. 1005 (1974).
31See notes 70-73 and accompanying text infra.
"Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (interpreting the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942); United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951) (interpreting
the Housing and Rent Act of 1947).
"Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 33 provided:
Whenever in the judgment of the [Price] Administrator any per-
son has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which
constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision of section 4
of this Act, he may make application to the appropriate court for an
order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compli-
ance with such provision, and upon a showing by the Administrator
that such person has engaged or is about to engage in such acts or
practices, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or
other order shall be granted without bond.
(Emphasis added.)
Housing and Rent Act of 1947, ch. 163, § 206(b), 61 Stat. 199-200 provided:
Whenever in the judgment of the Housing Expediter any person
has engaged or is about to engage in any act or practice which consti-
tutes or will constitute a violation of subsection (a) of this section, he
may make application to any Federal, State or Territorial court of
competent jurisdiction, for an order enjoining such act or practice, or
for an order enforcing compliance with such subsection, and upon a
showing by the Housing Expediter that such person has engaged or is
about to engage in any such act or practice a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted without
bond.
(Emphasis added.)
"Lower courts also construed the phrase "or other order" as allowing restitution
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. See Woods v. Wolfe, 182 F.2d 516 (3d
Cir. 1950); Jackson v. Woods, 182 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1950); Woods v. Gochnour, 177
F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1949), rev'g per curiam 81 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Wash. 1948); Woods
v. Wayne, 177 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1949); Ebeling v. Woods, 175 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1949);
Woods v. Richman, 174 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1949); Creedon v. Randolph, 165 F.2d 918
(5th Cir. 1948); Bowles v. Skaggs, 151 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1945); United States v.
Cowen's Estate, 91 F. Supp. 331 (D. Mass. 1950); Woods v. Bomboy, 85 F. Supp. 475
(W.D. Pa. 1949); Woods v. Lajeunesse, 82 F. Supp. 445 (D.N.H. 1949).
Except for the Fifth Circuit in Moore v. United States, 182 F.2d 332 (1950), a
decision reversed by the Supreme Court at 340 U.S. 616 (1951), lower courts also
construed the phrase "or other order" as allowing restitution under the Housing and
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cases, Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,4" the Court held that restitution
lay within the equitable jurisdiction of the court on either of two
theories. Restitution could be considered either as an "equitable ad-
junct to an injunction decree"43 or as "an order appropriate and nec-
essary to enforce compliance with the Act."44 The Court went to great
lengths to distinguish restitution, a remedy within the framework of
equity, from the legal remedy of statutory damages. It asserted that
restoration of the status quo in the public interest by returning one's
rightful property was "within the recognized power and within the
highest tradition of a court of equity."4 5 However, in housing discrimi-
nation situations, the scarcity of restitutionary claims as opposed to
other types of actions would make this remedy of little value to the
aggrieved person.
In contrast to restitution, actual and punitive damages do not
seem available under the statutory language of § 3613. The Long
court in its general endorsement of monetary recovery neglected to
consider the difference in language between § 3612(c), 0 concerning
enforcement of the Fair Housing Act by private persons, and § 3613.11
Both sections provide for relief from housing discrimination by in-
junction, restraining order, or other order. However, § 3612(c), unlike
§ 3613, stipulates the additional remedies of "actual damages and
Rent Act of 1947. See Woods v. Wayne, 177 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1949); United States v.
Cowen's Estate, 91 F. Supp. 331 (D. Mass. 1950); United States v. Mashburn, 85 F.
Supp. 968 (W.D. Ill. 1949).
42328 U.S. 395 (1946).
4Id. at 399.
"Id. at 400.
"Id. at 402. The Fifth Circuit followed this line of reasoning in United States v.
McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967), in which the enforcement provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1957 was construed. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
(c) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or
practice which would deprive any other person of any right or privilege
secured by subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the Attorney General
may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United
States, a civil action or other proper proceeding for preventive relief,
including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order.
(Emphasis added.) The Fifth Circuit held that the phrase "or other order" permitted
a court to direct the return of fines and reimbursement of costs where defendants in
state criminal proceedings had been unlawfully arrested to hamper a black voter
registration drive.
1142 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970), which appears in pertinent part in text accompany-
ing note 12 supra.
"742 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970), the text of which appears in note 13 supra.
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not more than $1,000 punitive damages .... ."" Inasmuch as Con-
gress specifically provided for actual damages in individual actions,
it is illogical to believe that the same remedy was contemplated with-
out specific provision in the very next section." It is more reasonable
to assume that Congress did not intend that the enforcement power
of the Attorney General be used to aggregate and collect the individ-
ual claims of discrimination victims for actual or punitive damages. 0
The Long court itself may have rejected the idea that punitive
damages were permissible under § 3613. In its reliance upon judicial
construction of the phrase "or other order" in analogous statutes, the
court cited no instances where such terminology had been interpreted
to allow punitive damages." Such a position would appear correct in
light of the federal court policy that denies recovery of punitive dam-
ages in equity. 2 However, by not specifically limiting monetary re-
covery to restitution, the court seems to have given tacit approval to
the awarding of actual damages as an appropriate form of "monetary
compensation." The court attempted to draw support for "compensa-
I"42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
"Critics of this line of reasoning may cite a contrary position reached by the courts
in interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See cases cited in note 54 infra.
42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(g) (1970), concerning enforcement of Title VII by private persons,
specifically provides for back pay as relief in employment discrimination suits. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), (1970), the text of which appears in note 53 infra, has no similar
provision concerning Government enforcement of the same rights. However, convinc-
ing legislative history provided the basis for allowing back pay in Government actions
under Title VII, despite the absence of express statutory authority. See note 55 infra.
No analogous congressional intent can be found in the legislative history of Title VIII.
See notes 65-66 and accompanying text infra.
5'Additional support for the proposition that Congress did not contemplate the
awarding of actual or punitive damages under § 3613 derives from a 180 day statute
of limitations imposed in § 3612(a) on private actions. As a federal district court
observed in United States v. West Suburban Bd. of Realtors, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN
HOUSING 13,641 (N.D. 111. Feb. 6, 1974), the purpose of this limitation period is to
insure that defendants are not prejudiced by destruction of records or inability to recall
specifics of a particular episode. If Congress had intended that the Attorney General
be allowed actual or punitive damages on behalf of private persons who had suffered
prior injury, a similar statute of limitations would arguably have been included in
§ 3613. However, the court in Board of Realtors did not accept such a proposition;
instead it allowed "monetary damages" in actions by the Attorney General, holding
that the 180 day statute of limitations in § 3612(a) was necessarily applicable to
§ 3613 actions. See note 21 supra.
"EQUAL OPPORTUNrTY IN HOUSING 13,631, at 14,094.
•2Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877); Livingston v. Woodworth, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 624 (1853). Although the Supreme Court has not considered the question of
punitive damages in equitable proceedings for almost a century, lower courts in apply-
ing federal law have consistently stressed the unavailability of such relief. See cases
cited in Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 947 (1956).
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tion" from the "back pay" cases arising under language resembling
§ 3613 in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6,53 the Government enforcement provi-
sion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In each case,54 the
phrase "or other order" was interpreted as allowing the awarding of
back pay to the Attorney General on behalf of victims of discrimina-
tion.5
142 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured
by this subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature
and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described,
the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate dis-
trict court of the United States by filing with it a complaint (1) signed
by him (or in his absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting
forth facts pertaining to such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting
such relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order or other order against the person or per-
sons responsible for such pattern or practice, as he deems necessary
to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein described.
(Emphasis added.) Functions of the Attorney General under this section were trans-
ferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 24, 1974. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1970), as amended, (Supp. I, 1972). The transfer of functions did
not affect any pending litigation. Id. § 2000e-6(d).
5 United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7 EMPLOYMENT PRAcTIcEs GUIDE 9066 (W.D. Okla.
Dec. 27, 1973); Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973);
United States v. Lathers Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 471 F.2d
408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973). Cf. United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.,
464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972) (back pay not allowed only because no bad faith shown);
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972) (back pay held a
permissible subject for consideration on remand).
5 1n the leading case of United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.
1973), two class actions and a suit by the Attorney General were consolidated for trial.
Finding that the defendants had engaged in discriminatory hiring and promoting, the
district court enjoined the discriminatory practices and required Georgia Power Com-
pany to hire, upon the next vacancies, those qualified black applicants who had been
previously rejected. The court also ordered discontinuation of the requirement that
employees in most positions have a high school diploma, finding that such a regulation
had a disproportionate racial impact without business necessity. Moreover, the court
struck down those aspects of the defendant's job seniority system which tended to stifle
blacks in low payirig jobs. However, back pay was denied except to the named plain-
tiffs in the private actions. All parties appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
The court of appeals granted the plaintiffs additional injunctive relief, directing
the district court to construct a nondiscriminatory recruitment policy for the defendant
company. The appellate panel also instructed the district court to evaluate the defen-
dant's testing program for discriminatory effects. Most importantly, the Fifth Circuit
held that back pay awards were permissible in actions brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral.
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Given the nearly parallel language of § 3613 and § 2000e-6, the
Long court's analogy between the two statutes would at first seem
appropriate. This is particularly true in light of the broad congres-
sional purpose of the Fair Housing Act"6 and the liberal construction
traditionally accorded civil rights statutes." However, § 3613 and
§ 2000e-6 are distinguishable on their faces"8 and by their different
legislative histories.59 Moreover, there is dissimilarity between the
remedies of actual damages for victims of housing discrimination and
back pay for victims of employment bias.10
Section 2000e-6, unlike § 3613, permits the Attorney General to
request "such relief' as he deems necessary." Section 3613 is more
The basis for allowing back pay was found in the statute's legislative history. The
original Civil Rights Bill considered in committee gave federal enforcement power to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and specifically permitted an order
for the reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay. H.R. 7152, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 707(e) (1964) provided in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in
an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent to take such affirmative action, including
reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay...
as may be appropriate.
When that bill appeared stymied on the Senate floor, a substitute bill was drafted by
the late Everett McKinley Dirksen (R-Ill.), Senate Minority Leader, and Mike Mans-
field (D-Mont.), Senate Majority Leader. This Dirksen-Mansfield substitute, taking
away the power of the EEOC to bring suit and giving it to the Attorney General,
became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although the substitute, unlike its predecessor,
did not specifically authorize the awarding of back pay, floor debate does not indicate
any intent to weaken this aspect of the bill. See 110 CONG. RE c. 12595-96 (1964)
(remarks of Senator Clark, floor sponsor of the original legislation); id. at 12721-25
(remarks of Senator Humphrey, a supporter); id. at 14219-21 (remarks of Senator
Holland, an opponent). In fact, the Fifth Circuit stated that Senator Clark probably
would not have responded so favorably to a weaker substitute. 474 F.2d at 920.
The court relied upon one additional factor in the legislative history of Title VII
for its broad construction enabling the Attorney General to seek back pay. The Equal
Opportunity Employment Act of 1972 amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 so as to
allow the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to bring an action for back pay
in a complaint brought through administrative channels. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)-(g)
(1970), as amended, (Supp. 11, 1972). If the respondent is a government, governmental
agency, or a political subdivision, that power instead is vested in the Attorney General.
Id. The Fifth Circuit would find a result "incongruous" that allowed back pay to be
awarded after administrative actions but not in the more serious violations under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970). 474 F.2d at 920.
5"See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
57See note 18 supra.
" See notes 61-63 and accompanying text infra.
"See notes 64-66 and accompanying text infra.
"See notes 67-76 and accompanying text infra.
6For text in pertinent part of § 2000e-6, see note 53 supra.
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narrow, providing that the Attorney General may request "such
preventive relief' as he deems necessary.2 Although no court has
apparently attempted to define "preventive relief," the term "pre-
ventive" in common usage is usually associated with the stopping of
future misconduct. 3 Although the awarding of any type of monetary
recovery to the Attorney General on behalf of victims of housing bias
would undoubtedly serve as a deterrent to potential discriminators,
its primary purpose would be to compensate those who had suffered
prior injury.
A second distinction between § 3613 and § 2000e-6 arises from
floor debate as a means of determining congressional intent. Whereas
particular comments in the Senate deliberation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 furnished strong support for the validity of back pay
despite the absence of express statutory authority," no similar legis-
lative history aids in the interpretation of § 3613. Title VIII was
added to the Civil Rights Act of 1968 on the floor of both houses of
Congress, thus committee reports do not discuss fair housing. " The
lengthy floor debate which preceded enactment offers no clear guid-
ance as to congressional intent regarding any type of monetary recov-
ery in actions brought by the Attorney General.6
62For text of § 3613, see note 13 sapra.
13For example, the court in Bates v. City of Hastings, 145 Mich. 574, 108 N.W.
1005, 1007 (1906), held that a "preventive injunction" necessarily operates upon unper-
formed and unexecuted acts. Another court in Commonwealth v. Burnett, 274 Ky. 231,
118 S.W.2d 558, 560 (1938), ruled that "preventive justice" was not a punishment of
past misdeeds but a precaution against future violations of the law.
"See note 55 supra.
63See H.R. REP. No. 473, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967).
6 The late inclusion of fair housing provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1968
followed several years of vigorous debate. After a strong plea from President Lyndon
B. Johnson for an effective federal law against discrimination in housing, fair housing
provisions were first introduced in Title IV of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966
(H.R.14765 and S.3296). The legislation would have prohibited all discrimination in
housing. While not providing for administrative enforcement, the measure would have
permitted actions both by private persons and by the Attorney General. However, a
much weakened bill emerged from the House of Representatives, restricting coverage
in several ways and excluding owner occupied dwellings of four or less units. Bitterly
debated in the Senate for several months, the bill died as proponents unsuccessfully
attempted to invoke cloture to defeat a filibuster. A proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967
(H.R.5700 and S.1026), providing for gradual coverage of almost all housing and con-
taining a clause on administrative enforcement by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, was not reported. The House instead passed another measure,
H.R.2516, which prescribed penalties for intimidation and certain acts of violence.
That legislation, without a fair housing title, died in the Senate upon the adjournment
of the first session of the 90th Congress.
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However, the most compelling reason for rejecting the analogy of
the Long court is the dissimilarity between the remedies of back pay
under § 2000e-6 and actual damages contemplated under § 3613.
Back pay awards entail the return of money wrongfully withheld from
victims of discrimination. Courts have generally characterized the
nature of these payments as equitable,"7 some explicitly labeling the
awards as "restitution." 8 As one commentator observed, back pay
usually involves definite amounts which can often be stipulated by
the parties rather than left to subjective evaluation." On the other
hand, actual damages, a remedy outside the scope of equity, would
require subjective determination of compensatory awards.
In Curtis v. Loether,70 the Supreme Court, considering the ques-
tion of the right to a jury trial in a private civil action for damages
brought under the Fair Housing Act,7 observed the traditional legal
nature of actual damages.72 By way of contrast, the Court remarked
that the courts of appeal have characterized back pay as "an integral
part of an equitable remedy, a form of restitution."73 The Court held
unanimously that either party was entitled to a jury trial in the
private action. Any interpretation of the equitable language of
§ 361371 that allows the Attorney General to receive actual damages
However, the Senate in 1968 resumed action on H.R.2516 and accepted a compro-
mise fair housing title. The House, possibly prompted to an accelerated pace by the
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King several days earlier, accepted the Senate
version on April 10, 1968 (H. Res. 1100). One day later President Johnson signed the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, with its fair housing title, into law. For a comprehensive
history of federal fair housing legislation, see Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative
History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969).
"TSee, e.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921 (5th Cir. 1973);
Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1121 (7th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether,
- U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1005 (1974); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
7 EMPLOYMENT PRAcTIcEs GUIDE T 9066 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 27, 1973), at 6501.
" See, e.g., Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1973), afl'd sub nora.
Curtis v. Loether, __ U.S. - , 94 S. Ct. 1005 (1974); United States v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 7 EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 9066 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 27,
1973), at 6501.
"4Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37
U. CHI. L. REv. 167, 173 (1969).
70 U.S. - , 94 S. Ct. 1005 (1974).
7 Because of the uncertainty of popular revulsion against discriminatory acts, the
plaintiff in Curtis sought to avoid a jury trial. She was supported by amicus curiae
briefs from the Attorney General and the National Commission Against Discrimina-
tion in Housing.
7294 S. Ct. at 1009.
"Id. at 1010. See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
"See note 19 supra.
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on behalf of private persons would effectively deprive defendants of
their right to a jury trial. 5 Such a result would be incompatible with
the Supreme Court's zealous protection of Seventh Amendment
rights."
Conclusion
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was intended as a com-
prehensive attempt by the federal government to attack discrimina-
tion in housing, a barrier labeled the "cornerstone of segregation."77
The legislation has succeeded in accomplishing much of its goal, but
the volume of complaints remaining on court and agency dockets
reveals the continuing existence of discriminatory practices." Despite
"U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides in pertinent part: "In suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved . . . ." The right to a jury trial does not attach where all issues to
be tried are equitable. Thus, the court in Long, buttressed by the equitable nature of
§ 3613, was able to deny defendants a jury trial on the issue of monetary recovery
although they clearly would have possessed this right under § 3612. But see United
States v. Pelzer Realty Co., EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOusING 13,656 (M.D. Ala. June
5, 1974). The question of the right to a jury trial in an action for monetary recovery
under § 3613, if permissible, was certified for interlocutory appeal along with the
principle question to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292 (1970). For text in pertinent part of § 1292, see note 22 supra.
"See Pernell v. Southall Realty, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1723 (1974); Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Professor Wright, commenting on
Dairy Queen and Beacon Theatres, asserted that the relevant policy expressed in the
Seventh Amendment is favorable to jury trials. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 407 (2d
ed. 1970). He maintains that "any seeming curtailment of the right to jury trial should
be scrutinized with the utmost care." Id. at 402.
"7REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 475 (1968).
Discrimination in housing retards progress in the entire area of civil rights. It reinforces
de facto segregation in the public schools. Moreover, it denies equal employment
opportunity to minorities who are unable to purchase suburban homes in proximity
to new jobs. One commentator discusses and dismisses two alternate explanations of
poverty and preference for the high degree of residential segregation. See Chandler,
Fair Housing Laws: A Critique, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 159 (1973). He cites convincing
surveys which show that large numbers of blacks have sufficient incomes to live outside
the inner-cities and that only small numbers wish to live in all or mostly black neigh-
borhoods.
"Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, former Chairman of the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, observed less than two years ago that there are relatively few blacks who
live in good neighborhoods. Hesburgh, Father Hesburgh's Program for Racial Justice,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 80. He dramatically emphasized the
point: "No segment of American life is more completely ruled by prejudice and white
superiority than housing. It is a simple fact that an underworld gangster or a white
call girl can more easily rent or buy a house in most white neighborhoods than a
19741
808 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
the broad congressional purpose behind Title VIII, the authority of
the Attorney General to seek monetary recovery on behalf of discrimi-
nation victims appears statutorily limited to restitution. Because the
Attorney General has greater resources than private persons for pro-
ceeding against discriminators, it may be desirable to enlarge that
authority."9 However, any expansion of the remedies provided by
§ 3613 should derive from congressional intent rather than dubious
judicial construction.
DAVID SAMUEL DE JONG
professional black man or woman." Id. at 76. Census statistics reveal that integration
in the suburbs is proceeding slowly. In 1970, blacks constituted only 4.5 per cent of
the suburban population of 67 large metropolitan areas, an increase of only .3 per cent
since 1960. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1971, at 16, col. 7.
"9Whether the Attorney General would elect to use his full statutory authority is,
of course, dependent on administration policy. Former Attorney General John Mitch-
ell, believing that primary responsibility for enforcing the Fair Housing Act rested with
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, took a passive stand on Justice
Department action. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1971, at 32, col. 5.
